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Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a worldwide cryptographic standard for
symmetric key cryptography. Many attacks try to exploit inherent weaknesses in the
algorithm or use side channels to reduce entropy. At the same time, researchers strive
to enhance AES and mitigate these growing threats. This paper researches the extension
of existing Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks, a family of side channel attacks,
on standard AES to Dynamic S-box AES research implementations. Theoretical analysis
reveals an expected average keyspace reduction of 2−88.9323 after one faulty ciphertext
using DFA on the State of Rotational S-box AES-128 implementations. Experimental
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EXTENDING DIFFERENTIAL FAULT ANALYSIS TO DYNAMIC S-BOX
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD IMPLEMENTATIONS
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Data security is a growing concern as more information transitions into digital formats.
Toward this end, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) establishes
the encryption algorithm standards and best practices within the United States. The
current standard for general purpose data encryption, established in 2001, is the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [1]. As the quantity and sensitivity of data entrusted to AES
grows, so does the incentive to compromise and reveal these secrets, thus many attacks
try to exploit inherent weaknesses in the algorithm or use side channels to reduce entropy,
such as Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). At the same time, continuing research strives to
bolster the security of AES and mitigate these growing threats. One such area of research
replaces a static component of the AES algorithm, the Substitution Box (S-box), with a
dynamic version. This research extends an existing DFA attack to several research based
Dynamic S-box AES implementations.
1.2 Research Objectives
The following itemizes the objectives of this research.
• Determine if current DFA attacks extend to Dynamic S-box AES variants. Both
cryptanalysis and cryptography are complex and dependent on the smallest details.
The consequences of changing any part of the target algorithm are not obvious, and
refitting an existing attack to a similar but new algorithm is non-trivial.
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• Reveal expected keyspace reduction power of DFA extensions. Existing attacks
use probabilistic theoretical analysis for computing expected keyspace reduction
power.
• Build functional attacks which demonstrate full key and plaintext recovery.
Working examples of encryption and attack variants enable verification of theoretical
results while providing tools for future use and analysis.
• Provide an easy to follow and self-contained resource which walks through
the mechanics and analysis of DFA attacks. Current research provides pointed
discussions of advanced methods [7, 9, 16–18, 24, 26], however basic understanding
requires less powerful methods [4, 13, 28]. Although fragmenting analysis makes
new research lightweight, it burdens nonexperts.
• Improve the overall security analysis of Dynamic S-box AES variants. Often,
research does not thoroughly test new encryption proposals. Certain test suites
and standards exist which ensure a few properties hold which are necessary, but
not sufficient for a secure cryptographic system [3]. Rigorous analysis and testing
of algorithms requires significant time, expertise and incentive. Thus, both white
and black hats often focus on widespread standards over young and unadopted
alternatives.
• Contribute to the literature of theoretical analysis. Existing work provides high-
level analysis, but often omit lower level details and actual data. This research aims
to address all levels of analysis, and building functional attacks creates actual data to
verify existing and new theoretical claims.
• Help inform and shape future discussions of cryptographic standards and
algorithmic design decisions.
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1.3 Scope and Limitations
This research considers all DFA attacks as possible sources of extension, and considers
all Dynamic S-box AES implementations as possible targets over which to extend. All
analysis performed only applies to specific source-target implementation pairs chosen, but
the leveraged concepts may yield results on other sources and targets. Due to the high level
of complexity and resources required for actual realization of DFA attacks, this research
instead relies on software simulated implementations.
1.4 Approach
Extending DFA attacks to AES variants is an untouched area of research. As the
founding work, this research focuses on the simplest, non-trivial and interesting target-
source combination. Background on each target and source enables a brief analysis for
choosing this target-source combination. This research then extends the existing source
DFA analysis to the chosen target AES variant. Implementing this new extended attack in
software validates the new theoretical analysis and demonstrates actual realization.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this document is as follows: Chapter 2 walks through the existing
research including some basics of cryptography and field theory, current Dynamic S-box
AES designs, and an overview of the existing DFA attacks on AES. Chapter 3 is a practice
in theory, explicitly defining AES variants and performing the theoretical analysis of DFA
extensions. Chapter 4 describes the methodology used to test and validate these attack
extensions. Chapter 5 discusses the experimentation results, specifically their significance
and how well they align with the theoretical analysis of Chapter 3. Lastly, Chapter 6
summarizes this work and discusses future areas of related research.
3
II. Background
This chapter covers a few basics of cryptology in Section 2.1, then walks through AES-
128 in Section 2.2 and a few basics of field mathematics in Section 2.2.1. A discussion of
Dynamic S-box schemes follows in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 introduces brute force attacks
and their constraints. Finally, Section 2.5 introduces DFA attacks providing a comparison
of attack power and constraints.
2.1 Cryptology
Cryptology encompasses both the study of keeping secrets, cryptography, and
breaking them, cryptanalysis [27]. To secure information, an encryption algorithm
transforms the clear plaintext message into a ciphertext using a secret encryption key. To
reveal the secret message, a decryption algorithm transforms a ciphertext back into the
plaintext using a secret decryption key. Encrypting with different keys results in different
ciphertexts, and only the correct decryption key reveals the original plaintext. Figure 2.1
illustrates this black box view. By convention, the actors involved are Alice, who encrypts
plaintexts and sends ciphertexts, and Bob, who receives the ciphertext and decrypts back to
plaintexts. The attacker is Eve who has access to ciphertexts through various methods such
as listening to network traffic.
Figure 2.1: High-Level Encryption and Decryption.
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2.1.1 Properties.
A ‘good’ cryptographic algorithm is one which is theoretically secure. That is, the
algorithm leaks no information. Given arbitrary ciphertexts, Eve knows nothing about
the associated plaintexts or keys. A few underlying principles and properties which are
necessary, but not sufficient for a secure cryptographic algorithm follow.
• Confusion. The ciphertext does not relate in a simple way to the key [27].
• Diffusion. Each bit of the plaintext affects many bits of the ciphertext. Similarly,
each bit of the ciphertext relies on many bits of the plaintext [27].
• Avalanche Criterion. Changing one bit of the plaintext or key should flip about half
of the ciphertext bits [12].
• Non-linearity. A simple linear function (addition and multiplication) on the input
cannot closely approximate the ciphertext.
• Apparent Complete Randomness. Produced ciphertexts statistically appear to be
completely random.
• Large Keyspace. The encryption key size is sufficiently large enough to make a
brute force attack infeasible (see Section 2.4).
• Kerchkoff’s Principle. Algorithms should not rely on security through obscurity.
Instead, Alice and Bob should always assume Eve knows the algorithm [27].
2.1.2 Attacks.
Cryptanalysis attacks conventionally divide into four categories based on the
information available. This section includes a fifth category, side channel, which acts as an
additional optional descriptor to supplement the first four. For the following explanatory
situations the encryption and decryption machines use secret keys which the operator
cannot access.
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• Ciphertext Only. Eve only has access to ciphertexts, but no access to the encryption
or decryption machines. Access to ciphertexts is always assumed, otherwise there
would be no need for Alice to encrypt her messages to Bob.
• Known Plaintext. Eve has no access to the encryption or decryption machines, but
has knowledge of what certain plaintext(s) encrypt to. This encompasses ciphertext
only.
• Chosen Plaintext. Eve has access to the encryption machine. She can encrypt a
number of plaintexts to manufacture associated (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs. This
encompasses known plaintext and ciphertext only.
• Chosen Ciphertext. Eve has access to the decryption machine. She can decrypt a
number of ciphertexts to manufacture associated (ciphertext, plaintext) pairs. This
encompasses ciphertext only.
• Side Channel. Eve has access to information not directly tied to the algorithm, such
as timing, processor sounds, power usage or outside information.
2.1.3 Algorithms.
Two main encryption schemes exist: symmetric and asymmetric (also known as
private and public key). In an asymmetric (public key) algorithm, decryption is a function
which acts upon the ciphertext to restore it to the plaintext, but decryption is not the
inverse of encryption. Encryption is a computationally efficient function, but the inverse is
computationally inefficient, such as factoring a large number. As a result decryption is a
different function which relies on a different key to efficiently undo the work of encryption.
RSA is the most recent standard public key algorithm [2]. In a symmetric (private key)
algorithm, decryption is the inverse of encryption. That is, encryption is an easily invertible
function reliant on a key. The same key enables both decryption and encryption. Often
users and developers choose symmetric encryption schemes, rather than asymmetric, to
6
encrypt large volumes of data because of their increased speed. AES is the most recent
standard symmetric key algorithm [2], and is what this paper examines.
2.2 AES
AES is a worldwide standard symmetric key encryption algorithm defined in [1].
Being symmetric, the same secret key enables both encryption and decryption of a
particular message, and decryption is the inverse of encryption. Unprotected input
messages are plaintexts, P, while the secure outputs are ciphertexts, C, both of length 128
bits. Figure 2.2 displays pseudocode for AES, and Section 2.2.3 further details the process.
Figure 2.2: AES Pseudocode Based on [8].
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The data of the algorithm at intermediate stages of encryption and decryption is the
state, S. To establish a standard throughout this paper, referencing of the state uses up to
three indexes: iS jk. The round index is i, j is the operation index and k is the byte index:
roundSoperationbyte . A 4x4 matrix of bytes represents each particular state
iS j with k ∈ {0, 1, ..., 15}
indexed as shown below in Figure 2.3. Alternatively, k ∈ {R0, R1, R2, R3} or k ∈ {C0,
C1, C2, C3} references a row or column of the state respectively, top to bottom and
left to right, rather than a particular byte. Key lengths are 128, 192, or 256 bits with
increased length corresponding to stronger theoretical cryptographic properties. These key
lengths identify implementations of AES: AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. Reference
to the key is equivalently the secret key and the encryption key. The algorithm consists
of four repeated steps performed on the state: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and
AddRoundKey. Section 2.2.2 discusses each in detail.
S0 S1 S2 S3
S4 S5 S6 S7
S8 S9 S10 S11
S12 S13 S14 S15
Figure 2.3: Generic AES State Representation with Byte Indexing.
2.2.1 Galois Field 28.
AES uses the Galois Field GF(28), a number system, for mathematical manipulations
of bytes, treating them as polynomials. GF(28) provides unique properties for calculation of
all bit manipulations, hexadecimal notation simply improves portability and ease of storage.
Each bit in the byte b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0, where bi is the ith bit, represents the coefficient of
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the xi term of the polynomial
b7x7 + b6x6 + b5x5 + b4x4 + b3x3 + b2x2 + b1x1 + b0x0.
For example,
0xA4 = 1010 0100 = 1x7 + 0x6 + 1x5 + 0x4 + 0x3 + 1x2 + 0x1 + 0x0 = x7 + x5 + x2.
The base 2 in GF(28) represents that coefficients are in modulus two. The following
example highlights addition.
0xA4 + 0x86 = 1010 0100 + 1000 0110
= (1x7 +0x6 +1x5 +0x4 +0x3 +1x2 +0x1 +0x0)+(1x7 +0x6 +0x5 +0x4 +0x3 +1x2 +1x1 +0x0)
= (x7 + x5 + x2) + (x7 + x2 + x)
= 2x7 + x5 + 2x2 + x
= x5 + x = 0010 0010 = 0x22
Thus, addition is simply the bitwise XOR operation, that is,
1010 0100
⊕ 1000 0110
0010 0010 = 0x22.
This observation has several implications. It affirms the intuition that 0 is the additive
identity I, since for any byte β, β+ 0 = β = β+I. Also, the XOR of any number with itself
is 0, so for any byte β, β + β = 0. From this property an inverse of addition exists and is, in
fact, itself. For any byte α:
(β + α) + α = β + (α + α) = β + 0 = β
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This fact enables further manipulation of equations. In the real numbers, performing
the inverse of ‘+5’ to both sides of the equation, x + 5 = 9, solves for x, resulting in
x + 5 − 5 = 9 − 5 ⇒ x = 4. Similar manipulations are possible in GF(28). Supposing β is
some unknown byte with the relation, β + 0x14 = 0x96, it is now possible to solve for β,
β + 0x14 + 0x14 = 0x96 + 0x14⇒ β = 0x82.
Additionally, it is impossible to add together any two numbers within GF(28) and
end up with a number outside of GF(28). Because of this, GF(28) is said to be closed
under addition. Further, addition in GF(28) is commutative, α + β = β + α, and
associative, α + (β + γ) = (α + β) + γ. These are important and non-trivial properties.
For perspective, subtraction is not commutative, 5 − 4 = 1 , −1 = 4 − 5, or
associative, 5 − (4 − 1) = 5 − (3) = 2 , 0 = (1) − 1 = (5 − 4) − 1, over the Integers,
and division is not closed over the Integers, 2 ÷ 3 = 2/3 < Z.
The exponent of 8 represents that eight powers of x, zero through seven, make up
elements of GF(28). If multiplication achieves a power of x greater than or equal to eight,
a reduction occurs using the irreducible polynomial for GF(28), x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. This
polynomial enables construction of GF(28), specifically the relation x8 + x4 + x3 + x+1 = 0.
So, the equivalence relation for reducing polynomials to powers less than 8 is x8 =
x4 + x3 + x + 1. Using this relation the following example illustrates multiplication.
0xA4 · 0x02 = 1010 0100 · 0000 0010
= (1x7 +0x6 +1x5 +0x4 +0x3 +1x2 +0x1 +0x0) ·(0x7 +0x6 +0x5 +0x4 +0x3 +0x2 +1x1 +0x0)
= (x7 + x5 + x2) · x
= x8 + x6 + x3
= (x4 + x3 + x + 1) + x6 + x3
= x6 + x4 + 2x3 + x + 1
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= x6 + x4 + x + 1 = 0101 0011 = 0x53.
Because of the relation x8 = x4 + x3 + x + 1, GF(28) is also closed under multiplication.
Multiplying the reduction by an appropriate power of x reduces powers greater than 8. For
example, x11 = x3 · x8 = x3(x4 + x3 + x + 1) = x7 + x6 + x4 + x3. This also illustrates
that multiplication distributes over addition. The multiplicative identity, like in the Real
Numbers, is 1. Lastly, every element aside from 0 has a multiplicative inverse (i.e., for
every β , 0 there exists an α such that β · α = 1).
2.2.2 State Operations.
• SubBytes (SB). [Substitution] The S-box performs bytes substitutions. This
transforms one byte at a time, altering every byte in the state matrix. The S-box
is an 8-bit 16x16 table built from an affine transformation on multiplicative inverses
which guarantees full permutation (S-box(a) , a) and provides non-linearity [1, 25].
A table logically represents this substitution function such that the incoming higher
order nibble identifies the row, while the lower nibble identifies the column. The
corresponding table entry then replaces the incoming byte. This substitution function
is fixed and well known. Figure 2.4 is a representation of the S-box. An example
lookup is S-box(0x12) = 0xC9.
Figure 2.4: AES S-box.
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• ShiftRows (SR). [Rotation] This step cyclically shifts the bytes in each row providing
inter-column diffusion. Iterating over every row, the ith row rotates i bytes to the left,
visually diagonalizing the columns for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Figure 2.5 below illustrates the
generic application of SR to the state.
Figure 2.5: AES Shift Row operation.
• MixColumns (MC). [Linear Combination] An invertible linear transformation
provides intra-column diffusion. A fixed and well-known matrix M multiplies with
each column of the state, S Ci for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Figure 2.6 shows the multiplication
of this fixed matrix with the first column of the state, M × S C0. Multiplication and
addition are as defined in GF(28).
2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3







2S0 + 3S4 + S8 + S12
S0 + 2S4 + 3S8 + S12
S0 + S4 + 2S8 + 3S12
3S0 + S4 + S8 + 2S12
Figure 2.6: Mix Column Example.
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• AddRoundKey (AK). [Addition / Exclusive Or] This step integrates the round key
with each state byte adding them together in the field (i.e., using the XOR function).
Figure 2.7 illustrates the AK operation.
Figure 2.7: Generic Add Key Step.
2.2.3 Encryption.
Depending on the AES implementation (128, 192 or 256 bit key), the algorithm
iterates over the state operations 10, 12 or 14 times creating rounds with an additional
round zero application of AK, and the last round (10, 12 or 14) omitting MC. Figure
2.8 shows AES-128 encryption as a logical application of operations that form the rounds.
Figure 2.9 depicts the AES-128 encryption algorithm left to right, top to bottom, and shows
proper round and operation state indexing. The algorithm stores the plaintext into the state
by column rather than by row, and similarly outputs ciphertext by column rather than by
row.
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Figure 2.8: Logical AES-128 Encryption.
2.2.4 Decryption.
Decryption is simply the inverse of each step performed in the opposite order, using
the round keys in reverse order. The inverse algorithm steps are InverseSubBytes (SB−1),
InverseShiftRows (SR−1), InverseMixColumns (MC−1) and AddRoundKey (AK). Figure
2.10 shows the logical flow of decryption, bottom to top.
• SB−1. The inverse S-box reverses the lookup process.
• SR−1. The ith row rotates i bytes to the right, i ∈ [0, 3].
• MC−1. Matrix multiplication with the inverse of the constant matrix used in MC.
• AK. XOR is its own inverse, thus AK−1 = AK, and AK is sufficient.
14
Figure 2.9: AES-128 Encryption.
15
Figure 2.10: Logical AES-128 Decryption.
2.2.5 Key Expansion Algorithm.
Another important aspect of AES is the generation of round keys through expansion of
the encryption key. AES-128 expands the 4x4 representation into a 4x44, or 11 4x4 round
keys. Similarly, AES-192 expands 4x6 to 4x52, and AES-256 from 4x8 to 4x60. This
expansion algorithm is the key schedule. Below are the relevant aspects of the process
for AES-128; AES-192 and AES-256 are logically similar. The following list defines
necessary operations and terminology.
• RotateWord (RW). Similar to the ShiftRow operation, a four byte word rotates one
byte to the left, such that the first byte becomes the last byte (e.g., RW(01 AB DC
EF) = AB DC EF 01).
• SubWord (SW). Similar to the SubByte operation, the S-box substitutes each byte of
a four byte word.
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• RoundConstant (rcon). Represents the exponentiation of 2 within GF(28), rcon(i)
= xi−1. Rounds 1-10 use an rcon value. Table 2.1 shows the computation of each of
these values.
rcon(1) = x0 = 1 = 0000 0001
rcon(2) = x1 = x = 0000 0010
rcon(3) = x2 = x2 = 0000 0100
rcon(4) = x3 = x3 = 0000 1000
rcon(5) = x4 = x4 = 0001 0000
rcon(6) = x5 = x5 = 0010 0000
rcon(7) = x6 = x6 = 0100 0000
rcon(8) = x7 = x7 = 1000 0000
rcon(9) = x8 = x4 + x3 + x + 1 = 0001 1011
rcon(10) = x9 = x5 + x4 + x2 + x = 0011 0110
Table 2.1: Calculation of Rcon Values 1-10.
By convention, W is the expanded round key matrix with W[i][ j] denoting the ith
column [0-43], jth byte [0-3]. As with storing the plaintext in 0S0, the first four columns
of W are the encryption key, filled by column. These first four columns are the round 0
key, with each subsequent set of four columns being the next round key. For columns 4-43:
W[i] = W[i − 4] ⊕ β. If i is not divisible by 4 (i.e., if the current column is not the first
column of a round key), then beta equals W[i − 1]. However, if i mod 4 = 0 (i.e., the
current column is the first column of round r’s key), then beta equals SW(RW(W[i− 1])) ⊕
[rcon(r), 0, 0, 0]. From this, round i key iK = [W(4i) −W(4i + 3)]. Figure 2.11 depicts the
AES-128 key schedule.
17
Figure 2.11: AES-128 Key Schedule.
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Knowing the last round key, 10K, enables reversal of the 128 bit key schedule since
RW, SW, and rcon are all fixed and well known. Figure 2.12 illustrates this process. Normal
use encryption and decryption never reverse the key schedule, instead always building up
the expanded key from the encryption key. However, many attacks leverage this property;
recovery of K10 reveals the encryption key.
2.3 Dynamic S-box
The S-box specifically is a common focus of research because it is the only operation
adding non-linearity. Several dynamic S-box AES approaches exist including: S-box
rotation [15, 22], chaotic S-box generation [10, 21, 30–32], switch S-boxes [5] and using
different irreducible polynomials in GF(28) for S-box construction [6]. A brief explanation
of each follows.
2.3.1 Rotational S-box.
This research variant of AES uses an altered key schedule to create two expanded
keys: one for encryption, and one for rotation. The Rotational S-box variant also introduces
a new algorithmic step, S-boxRotation, performed at the start of each round except round
zero. Each round uses one of these 256 S-boxes. This new algorithm reportedly matches
or slightly exceeds the performance of standard AES for diffusion through avalanche effect
measures and Strict Avalanche Criterion [15, 22].
• S-boxRotation (SBR). Based on a manipulation of the round rotation key, the S-box
rotates a specified amount (round rotation value) to the left. This rotation is a cyclic
byte rotation, wrapping around from the top left to the bottom right of the S-box.
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Figure 2.12: Reversal of the AES-128 Key Schedule.
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2.3.2 Chaotic S-box.
This research variant of AES computes an S-box for each encryption key by applying
a chaotic function on the encryption key. So, in AES-128, up to 2128 unique possible S-
boxes exist, but each encryption only relies on one. Chaotic schemes are a popular choice
for cryptographic applications due to their sensitivity to initial conditions, non-linearity,
appearance of randomness, and determinism [10, 21, 30–32]. Existing methods include use
of logistic map [10, 32], coupled map lattice of spatiotemporal chaos [21] and a piecewise
linear chaotic map [30, 31].
2.3.3 Reduction S-box.
This research variant of AES allows choice of the S-box used by making the
irreducible polynomial over GF(28), conventionally x8 = x4 + x3 + x + 1, which the S-
box construction uses by way of multiplicative inverses, an encryption parameter. Sending
this polynomial with the key enables decryption [6]. Since 30 irreducible polynomials exist
in GF(28), 30 possible S-boxes exist. No other logical changes apply to the algorithm.
2.3.4 Switch S-box.
This research variant of AES uses a pseudo-random number generator to determine if
encryption uses the S-box or inverse S-box. Decryption then uses the other. Alice appends
0 or 1 to the ciphertext to signify which S-box decryption requires. So, each encryption
uses one of two S-boxes [5].
2.4 Brute Force Attacks
Two types of brute force attacks exist, online and oﬄine. In both types, Eve throws
resources at the problem to test all possibilities until revealing the secret. Online brute
force attacks do not require Eve to have any knowledge of a system. Instead, she attempts
to use a password protected service, such as online banking or hard drive decryption, with
every possible key (and potentially username). Because online brute force attacks rely on
authenticating with a service, these attacks cannot leaverage precomputation and instead
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occur in real time. Oﬄine brute force attacks are a realization of a known plaintext,
chosen plaintext or chosen ciphertext attacks. For example, if Eve knows E(P) = C, she
can encrypt P with every possible K until a match of C is found. Oﬄine brute force
attacks can leverage precomputation and vary in complexity and approach ranging from
exhaustive search and table lookup, to combinatory Time/Memory Tradeoff attacks such as
Rainbow Tables. Brute force attacks succeed when computation time, block size, or key
size are sufficiently small. Attacks on AES, and all cryptographically secure solutions, are
infeasible by definition due to computation time and storage costs [27]. AES allows for an
increase in both with its AES-192 and AES-256 implementations.
2.4.1 Time/Memory Trade-off.
If Eve has a known plaintext, one which remains constant and often used by Alice,
such as a header “Dear Bob,”, the time intensive extreme of this spectrum dictates Eve
encrypting the plaintext with every possible key, and each time checking for a match against
the ciphertext. This method is good for singular attacks, but quickly repeats a great deal
of work if Alice changes the key. The memory intensive extreme of this spectrum has
Eve encrypting this known plaintext with every possible key, and creating a dictionary of
(ciphertext, key) entries. Now each time the key changes, Eve only needs to perform a
lookup to obtain the new key. Compromises between these two extremes are often the
best option, so as to reduce repeated work, while maintaining a reasonable storage burden.
Similar trade-offs are commonplace within cryptanalysis, with the best option dictated by
the attacker’s available resources and goals.
2.4.2 Brute Force Mitigation Techniques.
As previously stated, the three algorithmic factors which affect the feasibility of a brute
force attack are computation time, block size, and key size. The following list explores each
in more detail.
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• Computation Time. Often simply encryption time, this is the time required to
try one possible key. Longer and more complex algorithms and artificial delays
increase this burden. Artificial delays are practical against online brute force attacks
where Eve must interface with a front end authentication rather than the encryption
algorithm directly. Small increases significantly burden the attacker while remaining
unnoticeable to users. Considering a hypothetical encryption system which encrypts
in one nanosecond and a target algorithm that has 250 keys, key recovery requires a
maximum of:





However, artificially suppressing the encryption time to 0.001 seconds, still
apparently instantaneous to an end user, jumps this to:






≈ 35, 678 years.
• Block Size. This is the amount of data encrypted at once. If Eve wants to store all
the encryptions of a particular byte plaintext for an algorithm with 240 keys (6 byte





× 240 iterations ≈ 7.7 terabytes.
This although quite large is not wholly unreasonable. If the block size increases from






× 240 iterations ≈ 24.2 terabytes.
Again actual storage space is feasible provided a specialized computing environment
or a specific investment in storage, however efficiently managing and accessing this
data becomes increasingly complex, especially if Eve targets several plaintexts.
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• Key Size. This affects both storage and time constraints directly, however most
restrictive to time. Assuming a hypothetical encryption system which encrypts in
1 × 10−15 seconds and a target algorithm that has 280 keys, recovery requires a
maximum of:







Although a substantial amount of time and computing power, conceivably secrets
exist worth the investment. Increasing the keyspace to the equivalent of AES, this
becomes impossible:






≈ 1.08 × 1016 years.
2.5 Differential Fault Analysis
DFA is a category of side channel attacks, which leverage physical implementations
rather than theoretical weaknesses in the cryptographic algorithm. DFA relies on inducing
faults through controllable external factors such as voltage fluctuations, clock cycle speed
or a laser. These physical effects cause the current operation to resolve incorrectly, and just
inject one or more random byte faults. The algorithm continues execution to completion,
propagating the fault and creating a faulty ciphertext. This faulty ciphertext and its
corresponding correct ciphertext, in conjunction with knowledge of timing and placement
of the original fault allow for the construction of Differential Fault Equations (DFE).
Solving these equations reduces the possible encryption key space, fully revealing the key
or making brute force attacks feasible. Central to the success of these equations is the
SubBytes operation.
DFA divide into four main categories: DFA on the State [4, 13, 16, 19, 26], DFA on
the Key Schedule [7, 17], Round Modification Analysis [4, 9], and DFA on the Algorithm
[4, 7, 24]. Location of fault induction and the assumptions made about the faults
differentiate these attacks. The actual implementation and realization of these faults is
24
another area of research entirely outside the scope of this paper. However, [9, 14, 18, 24]
demonstrate arbitrary assumptions about fault placement and timing are reasonable.
2.5.1 DFA on the State.
Fault injection logically produces a fault in the state just before the MixColumns
operation of round r, a near terminal round. Actual injection of the fault can occur during
any operation between MixColumns of rounds r − 1 and r. Without loss of generality the
fault is random and corrupts byte 0, S0. MixColumns and ShiftRows propagate this fault,
building up relations within the columns of the XOR of the correct and faulty ciphertext.
Figure 2.13 shows fault propagation in AES-128 with the fault injected at 7S20. Current
versions of this attack fully recover the key with 2 faulty ciphertexts for AES-128, 2 for
AES-192, and 3 for AES-256, and allow fault injection up to the third to last round while
maintaining a reasonable level of complexity [16].
Figure 2.13: DFA on the State Fault Propagation in AES-128 [16].
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2.5.2 DFA on the Key Schedule.
Fault injection occurs on the rth round key. The fault then propagates throughout the
state and the following round keys. Without loss of generality the fault is random and
corrupts the first byte of the rth key. More complex relations than those from DFA on
the State build up from the XOR of the correct and faulty ciphertext. Figure 2.14 shows
specifically how the fault spreads through the key schedule while Figure 2.15 shows fault
propagation through the state and key. Current versions of this attack fully recover the key
with 2 faulty ciphertexts for AES-128, 4 or 6 for AES-192, and 4 for AES-256, and allow
fault injection up to the third to last round [17].
Figure 2.14: DFA on the Key Schedule Fault Propagation in AES-128 [17].
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Figure 2.15: DFA on the Key Schedule Fault Propagation in AES-128 [17].
2.5.3 Round Modification Analysis.
Round Modification Analysis (RMA) is a generalization of Round Reduction Analysis
(RRA), which induces a fault, changing the number of AES rounds executed. RRA reduces
the number of rounds, typically to one or two, weakening the encryption significantly.
RMA however allows for the possibility of increasing the rounds of AES, resulting in
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faulty ciphertexts. Like other forms of fault analysis, these ciphertexts reduce the key
range possibilities, making brute force attacks feasible [4, 9].
2.5.4 DFA on the Algorithm.
Although not explicitly defined in prior work, [4, 7, 24] exploit a fault induced into
an algorithmic component such as the S-box or rcon. These attacks allow unique control
and in some cases even enable known plaintext attacks. These often require explicit control
over fault values.
2.5.5 DFA Mitigation Techniques.
Because DFA relies on inducing faults, error checking schemes mitigate this threat.
Examples include recalculating the last several rounds of an encryption checking for a
match, and timing analysis checking operations run their expected time [11, 16, 20, 23,
29]. Because these are an extra burden, minimum safeguards protect the most easily
exploitable last rounds. Thus, research pushes successful DFA towards more complex and
computationally expensive fault injections in earlier rounds, and more control over fault
injection location and value.
2.6 Background Summary
AES is the current symmetric key cryptographic standard. As such, improving and
attacking AES are continuous areas of research. One potential area of improvement uses
a Dynamic S-box rather than the current fixed S-box. This potentially reduces the amount
of viable precomputation possible in brute force attacks, adds additional complexity to the
algorithm and increases encryption time. One current attack vector on AES is DFA. These
attacks use correctly and incorrectly encrypted ciphertexts to build up relations that allow
key recovery.
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III. Theoretical Attack Analysis
This chapter discusses research design decisions and explains the attack extension.
Section 3.1 defines the problem and outlines the approach. Section 3.2.1 discusses trade-
offs and complexities of variant AES implementations, then explicitly defines the target
variant in Section 3.2.2. A discussion of necessary assumptions and extensibility of DFA
attacks follows in Section 3.2.3. Section 3.2.4 explains the existing theoretical analysis of
the attack source. Finally, Section 3.3 provides theoretical attack extension analysis.
3.1 Problem Definition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The goal of this research is to determine the complexity of extending DFA to
existing dynamic S-box AES designs. This research expects DFA attacks become more
complex and difficult on a dynamic S-box AES design based on the additional complexity
introduced. This research expands the overall security analysis of a dynamic S-box AES to
assess its practicality and usefulness compared to the standard AES.
3.1.2 Approach.
This research employs probabilistic analysis to determine the keyspace reduction
power of non-trivial DFA attack extensions to dynamic S-box AES research variants.
Specifically choosing attack targets and sources guides analysis towards interesting and
non-trivial extensions. These extensions use the concepts of existing work, while providing
novel approaches where necessary.
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3.2 Attack Targets and Sources
3.2.1 Potential Attack Targets.
As outlined in Section 2.3 the four possible Dynamic S-box designs are Rotational,
Chaotic, Reduction, and Switch. 128 bit key length implementations are the base case, and,
thus, the first step in extension. A high-level cursory consequences discussion follows.
• Rotational. Although this variant adds an additional operation, the AES encryption
algorithm retains much of its structure. The S-box, though dynamic, relies on the
existing AES S-box, with 256 total permutations each round, for 10 rounds, a total
of 280 possibilities from a simple operation on the existing structures. The S-box
rotation appears to add a great deal of complexity with little additional effort or
change to the algorithm.
• Chaotic. No change to the logical flow of the AES algorithm means current systems
would only need to update the key schedule and S-box. However, building and
storing the S-box for each encryption would likely limit the amount of optimization
encryption hardware could perform. The potential increase of complexity is 256! ≈
8.5 × 10506 for every possible S-box. Each key creates exactly one S-box, limiting
this to 2128. However, construction potentially creates any S-box, including the
cryptographically broken. For example, the possibility exists that a key creates the
identity S-box.
• Reduction. Within finite Galois fields, there exist only a certain number of
irreducible polynomials. Only 30 exist for a Galois Field of size 28. This only
introduces a complexity of about 25, which is a trivial work factor.
• Switch. Two S-box possibilities, both already employed, make this variation similar
to AES when examined by necessary components. Updating to this S-box scheme
would require the least work and would allow the most optimization. However,
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this variation also provides the least increased complexity of 2. This increased
complexity is only for oﬄine attacks though, because by sending 0 or 1 in the clear,
Eve knows which S-box to use, so there is no increase in complexity.
From this exploration, extending to the chaotic design would require significant computing
power and analysis of chaotic properties, because no changes occur to the logical flow
of the algorithm, but a huge pool of 2128 possible S-boxes exist. Reduction would be a
trivial extension by repeating the attack 30 times or require no extra work if the irreducible
polynomial identifier was sent ‘in the clear’ with the key, and switch would be no more
complex, but simply require implementation. The rotational limit of 256 S-box options
makes the work factor reasonable while the possibility of any one of these S-boxes used
each round makes for interesting complexity. Thus rotational which does not alter the
nature of the algorithm and adds complexity, while maintaining a feasible work factor is
the most interesting and reasonable option to attack.
3.2.2 Attack Target Implementation.
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, Rotational S-box AES variants add an additional round
operation, SboxRotation. Repeatedly applying this operation to the same S-box, rather than
to the standard AES S-box each time, makes this iterative. Logically in programming, SBR
is a function acting on an S-box passed by reference; rotating the S-box a specified amount.
Additionally, this variant creates two expanded keys. AK uses the expanded encryption key,
while SBR uses the expanded rotation key. Figure 3.1 illustrates the encryption process as
rounds of operations. A slightly different key schedule creates these two expanded keys.
Two key schedule schemes exist.
• Key Schedule 1. The S-box rotates by the XOR of all the bytes of the encryption
key. Performing the key schedule as in normal AES, but using this rotated S-box for
SubWords, creates an expanded key which is both the expanded encryption key, K,
and the expanded rotation key, RK.
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• Key Schedule 2. Key Schedule 1 creates an expanded rotation key, RK. The once
rotated S-box used in Key Schedule 1 rotates a second time by the XOR of all the
bytes of the expanded rotation key. Performing the key schedule as in normal AES,
but using this twice rotated S-box for SubWords, creates the expanded encryption
key, K.
Figure 3.1: Logical RAES-128 Encryption.
Two reduction schemes exist to create rotation values from the round rotation key. This
round rotation value designates by how much the S-box rotates in the associated round of
encryption. SBR performs this rotation.
• Rotation Reduction 1. The round rotation value is the last byte, iRK15 in the round
rotation key.
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• Rotation Reduction 2. The round rotation value is the XOR of all the bytes in the
round rotation key.
Combinations of these Key Schedules and Rotation Reductions result in four
proposed Rotational S-box AES (RAES) implementations labeled Types 1 through 4.
Higher numbers relate to increased theoretical security due to complexity, confusion and
computation time. Choice of key schedule is the primary security influence.
• RAES Type 1. Key Schedule 1 and Rotation Reduction 1
• RAES Type 2. Key Schedule 1 and Rotation Reduction 2
• RAES Type 3. Key Schedule 2 and Rotation Reduction 1
• RAES Type 4. Key Schedule 2 and Rotation Reduction 2
Decryption requires one extra step of priming the inverse S-box. The S-box used in
round 10 of encryption is the standard AES S-box rotated 11 or 12 times depending on the
Key Schedule used. Rotating the inverse S-box by these same values correctly orients it
for decryption. Once correctly initialized, decryption follows as expected with SBR−1 a
rotation of inverse S-box to the right by the round rotation value. Figure 3.2 illustrates this
process.
Explicitly establishing the mechanisms of these implementations required several
design decisions beyond the scope of [15, 22]. Appendix A justifies these decisions and
discusses the alternatives. Appendix B provides sample encryptions and key schedules of
all 4 Types to facilitate validation and future use of this algorithm.
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Figure 3.2: Logical RAES-128 Decryption.
3.2.3 Potential Attack Sources.
As outlined in Section 2.5 the four possible DFA attacks are: DFA on the State, DFA
on the Key Schedule, Round Modification Analysis, and DFA on the Algorithm. Using a
rotational S-box affects each uniquely. A high-level consequences discussion follows.
• DFA on the State. This requires no assumptions about the value of the fault injected.
Faults only propagate through the state. Rotating the S-box does not affect the
location of the propagation, only the values. Most likely, this extension could largely
use existing work.
• DFA on the Key Schedule. This requires no assumptions about the value of the
fault injected. Depending on RAES Type and the key expansion targeted, potentially
only the values change, not location of faults. The altered key schedule increases the
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complexity and analysis required for this attack, though most likely this extension
could largely use existing work.
• Round Modification Analysis. This requires a controllable or predictable fault
injection value. Leveraging a fault injection is the only DFA element of RMA. Use
of a Rotational S-box does not significantly impact methods used in key recovery
when altering the number of rounds. These methods are a set of more conventional
cryptanalysis approaches.
• DFA on the Algorithm. The most abstract DFA category which allows many
possibilities. Many creative options allow powerful attacks, but these attacks likely
need the most control of values injected. DFA on the Algorithm is an open-ended
class with no clear implementations to imitate.
From this analysis, DFA on the State and DFA on the Key Schedule are the most
logical and interesting choices in identifying a non-trivial extension of an existing attack.
This research pursues DFA on the State for the slightly less expected complexity. Extending
to DFA on the State likely allows use of existing attack properties and analysis, while still
requiring creative workarounds to the added complexity.
3.2.4 Attack Source Implementation.
Extending DFA on the State to RAES requires understanding of the existing attack.
The theoretical analysis detailed in [28] examines probabilities that certian conditions hold
to determine the attack’s keyspace reduction power. What follows is a synopsis of this
analysis.
Eve obtains a correct encryption E of plaintext P, using key, K. She then leverages
attack capabilities to inject a fault at 8S20, obtaining a faulty encryption E¯ of plaintext P,
using key K. The single byte fault propagates to corrupt the entire ciphertext. S¯ and C¯
represent the faulty state and ciphertext. Figure 3.3 represents the XOR of the last three
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rounds of E and E¯. ∆S and ∆C represent the state and ciphertext respectively. Assigning
the difference between E and E¯ at the fault injection site 8∆S20 to the variable ‘a’, relations
build up around this XOR difference. A walkthrough of fault propagation through each
operation follows.
Figure 3.3: XOR of Correct and Faulty AES-128 Encryption, Rounds 8-10.
• MC. Figure 3.4 highlights the transition between 8∆S2 and 8∆S3. Figure 3.5 shows
the underlying math. Because multiplication distributes over addition in GF(28),
MC(8S2) ⊕ MC(8S¯2) = MC(8S2 ⊕ 8S¯2) = MC(8∆S2).
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Figure 3.4: XOR of Correct and Faulty AES-128 MC Operation.
Figure 3.5: XOR MC Walkthrough.
• AK. Figure 3.6 highlights the transition between 8∆S3 and 8∆S4. Because the fault
injection does not corrupt the key schedule, the expanded key is the same for both
E and E¯. Thus, as shown in Figure 3.6, every byte of 8∆K is 0. Because XOR, or
addition in GF(28) is commutative, the order of performing this XOR does not matter,
and so 8∆S4 = AK(8∆S3) = 8∆S3 ⊕ 8∆K = 8∆S3. The equations below demonstrates
this relationship.
8∆S40 = (
8S30 ⊕ 8K0) ⊕ (8S¯30 ⊕ 8K0)
= (8S30 ⊕ 8S¯30) ⊕ (8K0 ⊕ 8K0)
= (8S30 ⊕ 8S¯30) ⊕ (0)
= 8∆S30
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Figure 3.6: XOR of Correct and Faulty AES-128 AK Operation.
• SB. 9∆S1 = SB(9S0) ⊕ SB(8S¯0). Distributing SB over XOR is not possible.
SB(00) ⊕ SB(01) = 63 ⊕ 7C = 1F
SB(00 ⊕ 01) = SB(01) = 7C , 1F
SB(02) ⊕ SB(03) = 77 ⊕ 7B = 0C , 1F
This prohibits further reductions, thus relations from 9∆S0 cannot move forward into
9∆S1. Figure 3.7 highlights this.
Figure 3.7: XOR of Correct and Faulty AES-128 SB Operation.
• SR. No manipulation of byte values occur in this step, thus the XOR values remain
unchanged, but move byte position as dictated by the SR operation. Figure 3.8 shows
this.
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Figure 3.8: XOR of Correct and Faulty AES-128 SR Operation.
Clearly defined fault propagation allows discussion of the analysis to move forward.
As the attacker, Eve only has C and C¯, and thus ∆C. Knowing AK has no effect on ∆S
values, 10∆S2 = ∆C. Again, SR does not affect ∆S values, and so 10∆S1 = SR−1(∆C). Thus
with C and C¯, Eve also knows 10∆S1. This attack exploits the known relations that exist in
10∆S0, and the possible 10K that enable 10∆S1 to step back and satisfy these relations. The
set of DFE to represent this for 10∆S0C0 follow.
2b = SB−1(C 0 ⊕ 10K 0) ⊕ SB−1(C¯ 0 ⊕ 10K 0) (3.1)
b = SB−1(C 7 ⊕ 10K 7) ⊕ SB−1(C¯ 7 ⊕ 10K 7)
b = SB−1(C10 ⊕ 10K10) ⊕ SB−1(C¯10 ⊕ 10K10)
3b = SB−1(C13 ⊕ 10K13) ⊕ SB−1(C¯13 ⊕ 10K13)
Since b can be any value a byte can hold, except 0, b is in {1, 2, ..., 255}. Were b zero,
fault injection failed, and thus C = C¯, so there is nothing to exploit. Examining the first
equation of the set, regardless of what values C0 and C¯0 hold, of the 255 possible values of
2b, 128 yield 0 10K0 key hypothesis which satisfy Equation 3.1, 126 yield 2 and 1 yields 4.
Iterating over all possible values of C0, C¯0 and 10K0 reveal this. Thus, on average for any
one particular value of 2b, there exists (2 × 126 + 4)/255 = 256/255 just over 1 valid 10K0
hypothesis. Considering all 255 possible values of 2b yields an expected 255 × 256255 = 256
10K0 hypotheses. This result is not a reduction yet since 10K0 is one byte which can hold
one of 28 = 256 values. The same holds for each of the four equations in the set.
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Now considering all four equations at once, for a given value of b, each equation on
average should return about one 10Ki value. These four values form a quartet of key bytes
{10K0, 10K7, 10K10, 10K13} which is one hypothesis. Considering all 255 b values should
create 256 of these quartets. This column analysis reduces the keyspace of these four bytes
from (28)4 to 28.
A set of equations like those seen above exist for each of the four columns of 10∆S0,
thus each of these reduce similarly. Each column is independent, making no further
relations possible from these relationships in round 10. So, the original keyspace of
2128 = ((28)4)4 reduces to (28)4 = 232 when considering all combinations of these quartets.
Equivalently, these sets of equations have a keyspace reduction power of 2−96.
This analysis and process is the essence of the DFA attack. Reductions based on
properties that must hold over the SB operation on the XOR of a correct and faulty
ciphertext. Stepping back to round 9 produces a similar reduction, and building relations
over 9S 0C0 further reduces the keyspace to 2
8. However, leveraging round 9 information
requires a much greater amount of work for a much smaller reduction. Fully reducing the
10K keyspace to 1 requires additional C, C¯ pairs. This produces two independently reduced
10K keyspaces of 232. The intersection of these keyspaces yields one unified reduced
keyspace. Keys should randomly appear in both with likelihood 232 × 2322128 = 2−64. Thus
only the valid 10K should remain. Once recovered, as discussed in Section 2.2.5 reversal
of the key schedule reveals the original encryption key. The round 10 reduction has a work
factor of (28) × 16 = 212 since stepping each 10Ki byte back occurs individually and has
a keyspace reduction power of 2−96. However the round 9 reduction has a work factor
of 232 since stepping back through to 9S 0C0 requires calculating
9K which relies on 10K.
Individually checking all 232 possible keys has a reduction power of 2−24. If Eve can only
obtain one C, C¯ pair and she knew the format of the unencrypted data, she could reasonably
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perform this round 9 reduction and decrypt C with each of the 256 possible keys to see if
any of the resulting plaintexts conform to the expected data format.
3.3 Attack Analysis
A rough estimate of the memory necessary to calculate the S-box relations used in the
attack described in Section 3.2.2 is (possible Ci)×(possible C¯i)×(possible 10Ki)×(storage
cost). Each calculation needs to store 4 bytes, Ci, C¯i, 10Ki, and b. Thus roughly
256 × 256 × 256 × 4 = 226 bytes, or roughly 0.067 GB. When pushing this analysis to
the Rotational S-box, storage costs roughly become (possible round 10 S-box rotation
values)×(possible Ci)×(possible C¯i)×(possible 10Ki)×(storage cost). Each calculation
needs to store 5 bytes, r10, Ci, C¯i, 10Ki and b. Thus roughly 256×256×256×256×5 ≈ 234.32
bytes, or approximately 21.5 GB. While this may not be a burden for supercomputers or
specialized workstations, it is beyond the processing power of most personal workstations.
As such, extension requires a different analysis approach. The existing fault propagation
model holds, but reduction requires knowing the S-box used in round 10.
3.3.1 Rotation Step Analysis.
Examining the SBR operation, Figure 3.9 shows the standard, unrotated S-box, S-
box0. Looking up 0x02: S-box0(0x02) = 0x77. Rotating S-box0 by one results in S-box1,
SBR(1, S-box0) = S-box1, Figure 3.10 displays this new rotated S-box. Again looking
up 0x02: S-box1(0x02) = 0x7b. Looking up 0x03 in S-box0 achieves this same result.
Rotating S-box1 by one results in S-box2, SBR(1, S-box1) = S-box2. Figure 3.11 visualizes
this twice rotated S-box. Looking up 0x02 again: S-box2(0x02) = 0xf2.
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Figure 3.9: RAES S-box0.
Figure 3.10: RAES S-box1.
Figure 3.11: RAES S-box2.
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Again, looking up 0x04 S-box0 produces the same output. Just one rotation of S-box0
by 2, SBR(2, S-box0) also computes S-box2. In fact, any number of rotations reduce to just
one rotation of S-box0:
SBR(rn, SBR(· · · , SBR(r1, SBR(r0, S−box0)) · · · )) = SBR((r0+r1+· · ·+rn)%256, S−box0).
Addition here is over the integers, not GF(28) and although the mod256 is not necessary,
it is still correct. Rotating S-box0 by 256 rotates the S-box all the way around back to its
starting position. Considering rotation an adjustment of lookup indicies further simplifies
the S-box rotation. This research denotes addition over the integers mod256 with . As
previously noted, looking up 0x02 in S-box1 is also 0x03 in S-box0. Adjusting the lookup
index of 0x02 by an increase of 1 has the same effect of rotation. This adjustment is exactly
0x02  0x01 since the lookup indicies are the incoming byte nibbles. Again, looking up
0x02 in S-box2 is also 0x04 in S-box0. Adjusting the lookup index by an increase of 2
produces this same effect. This adjustment is exactly 0x02  0x02. In fact, this property
holds for all possible rotation values. Similarly, this manipulation holds over the inverse
SBR−1 as well.
The Rotational S-box implementations use iterative S-box rotations. ir represents the
rotation value for a particular round as calculated from the expanded rotation key. The
key schedule rotates by −1r and if necessary (Type 3 and Type 4) −2r. Then round 0 of
encryption uses S-box[−2r]−1r. Since round 0 does not apply SBR, this value is 0R, the total
iterative rotation value of the S-box in round 0. Advancing to round 1, the S-box rotates by
1r, and 1R = 0R  1r. Thus S-box lookups in round 1 can follow the form SB(byte  1R)
using S-box0. Repeating this process out through round 10, 10R = 9R  10r = −2r  −1r 
1r  · · · 10r, and S-box0 lookups follow the form SB(byte  10R). Thus, ( iR) replacing
every instance of SBR creates an equivalent algorithm.
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3.3.2 Mapping Rotate to an Operation in GF(28).
Figure 3.12 shows an alternative view of the fault propagation model using this
additive definition of S-box rotation. With S-box rotation now defined as addition mod
256, leveraging the existing attack relations might now be possible.
10∆S10 = (
10S00  10R) ⊕ (10S¯00  10R)
Assuming  distributes over addition (⊕) in GF(28), then 10∆S10 = 10R  (10S00 ⊕ 10S¯00) =
10R 2b. Similarly, 10∆S14 = (10S04  10R) ⊕ (10S¯04  10R) = 10R (10S04 ⊕ 10S¯04) = 10R
b. Now assuming  distributes over multiplication in GF(28), then 10∆S10 = 2(10R b)
and 10∆S14 = (
10R b). Letting (10R b) = v, the final result is 10∆S10 = 2v, 10∆S14 = v.
This result restores the original 10∆S1 column relations regardless of 10R, requiring no
new attack analysis to match the reductions established in the existing attack by using
S-box0. However, this conclusion requires proving the assumptions that  distributes over
both addition and multiplication in GF(28). Testing these assumptions with discrete values
shows  does not distribute over either addition or multiplication in GF(28), so the initial
fault propagation remains unexploitable.
1 (2 × 3) = 1 (6) = 7 , 12 = 3 × 4 = (1 2) × (1 3)
1 (2 ⊕ 3) = 1 (1) = 2 , 7 = 3 ⊕ 4 = (1 2) ⊕ (1 3)
3.3.3 Alternate Attack Analysis on Standard AES.
Since analysis of SBR as  is not sufficient to extend the attack, an analysis of the
existing attack described in 3.2.2 with a slightly different way of thinking follows. This
analysis removes the need for full inspection of all S-boxi properties. Figure 3.13 shows
10∆S of the standard AES attack for reference.
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Figure 3.12: XOR of Correct and Faulty RAES-128 Encryption, Rounds 8-10.
Figure 3.13: XOR of Correct and Faulty AES-128 Encryption, Round 10.
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Examining 10∆S1 which is known, 127 10∆S00 values are possible out of 255, this set of
values is {10∆S00}. Thus, the likelihood of a random value in {1,255} being in {10∆S00} is 127255 .
This likelihood is also true for 10∆S04,
10∆S08, and
10∆S012. So, for a given 2b ∈ {10∆S10}, the
probability of 2b ∈ {10∆S10}, b ∈ {10∆S14}, b ∈ {10∆S18}, and 3b ∈ {10∆S112} is 1× 127255 × 127255 × 127255 .
Since there are 127 2b ∈ {10∆S00}, the number of 2b expected to satisfy the above relation
and be in each set is 127 × (127255 )3.
The 256 possible 10K0 key byte values step back to 127 2b values. So, each valid 2b
value averages to an expected 256127 keyspace for that byte. Thus, the average keyspace for a
valid 2b, b, b, 3b column is (256127 )
4.
Combining the number of valid 2b columns with the keyspace for each valid 2b















The expected keyspace per valid 2b and the expected number of valid 2b have no influence
on this reduction. Since columns are independent, applying the same relation to each of the





The above reworking of the existing attack on standard AES revealed the average
reduction across the S-box is independent of the number of resulting valid 2b or the
expected keyspace per valid 2b because these values cancel. Thus, no analysis needs to
be done around the Rotational S-box. The averages smooth out all inconsistencies and
discrete numbers. Therefore, regardless of the S-box used, the average resulting keyspace
is about 232.0677. Since, in round 10, 10R can be any value in {0, 1, ..., 255}, 256 of
these 232.0677 keyspaces exist. The total keyspace remaining after stepping back to 10∆S0 is
approximately 232.0677 × 28 = 240.0677.
The existing attack reduces in round 9 by stepping back each possible remaining 10K.
This extension has an increased work factor based on the larger 240.0677 remaining keyspace.
46
Additionally, stepping back 10K to 9K requires use of SubWord. However, because the
expanded encryption key uses a rotated S-box, each 240.0677 possible keys steps back 28
ways for each possible S-box rotation, further increasing the work factor to 248.0677. Since
extending an attack is the goal of this research, and the round 10 analysis contains the
essence of this DFA on the State attack while maintaining a much higher power to speed
ratio, this research only extends the round 10 portion of this attack.
Access to a second cipher pair allows an independent reduction to an alternate reduced
keyspace of approximately 240.0677. Intersecting these keyspaces creates the remaining
valid keyspace. Assuming the incorrect keys in each reduced keyspace are random,
240.0677 × 240.06772128 ≈ 2−47.8646 keys remain. Thus, only the valid K10 key should remain.
Recovery of the encryption key K0 still requires reversal of the key schedule.
3.3.5 Reversing the Key Schedule.
The previous section provides the theoretical keyspace reduction power of the attack
extension regardless of Rotational S-box Type implementation. The analysis shows that
full recovery of 10K is possible. With standard AES, recovery of 10K concludes the attack
because the key schedule is fully reversible. Following is an analysis of reversing the key
schedule for all RAES Types.
Knowing the S-box in standard AES makes reversal of the key schedule possible. The
RAES encryption key schedule uses S-box−1R, which is unknown. However, this S-box is
one of only 256 possibilities, meaning there are 256 potential encryption keys. Reversing
to each of these is trivial.
• Key Schedule 1. For key schedule 1, −1R = −1r is the XOR of all encryption key
bytes. Reversal of the expanded encryption key with a particular −1r reveals the first
16 bytes, 0K, the encryption key. Checking that the XOR of these bytes matches
the −1r value used to reverse each particular expanded key reduces the possible −1r
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values. Since one −1r is valid out of 256, and 256 options are checked, −1r should
reduce to one possibility.
• Key Schedule 2. In key schedule 2, −2r is the XOR of all encryption key bytes 0K
and 0K = 0RK. Expanding this out to the expanded rotation key allows computation
of −1r. Checking this −1R against the value used to reverse the encryption key, like in
the key schedule 1 analysis above, should reduce to one possibility. Thus the same
reduction power is possible, requiring an extra step of key expansion.
If more than one 0K remain after this −1R check, two more reduction checks are
possible. First, rebuilding the expanded rotation key and calculating is associated 10R value
enables a check that this matches the 10R used to create 10K. If multiple possibilities still
remain, checking 9∆S0 relations provide a final reduction. Using round 9 relations is not
an unreasonable work factor like a full round 9 reduction because this instance only steps
back one 10K and few possible 9R should remain after the two prior reductions.
3.4 Theoretical Attack Summary
Overall, this attack extension is slightly less powerful, and less flexible to Eve’s
resources and constraints. With only one cipher pair, the extended attack is much
less powerful, effectively only able to reduce the keyspace to 240.0677 with a reasonable
work factor, where the existing attack could reduce the keyspace to 28 with reasonable
computational effort. However, if Eve has access to, or the capability to create two or




This chapter details the experimental methodology for verifying the theoretical results
of Chapter 3. First, Section 4.1 discusses the approach and expected results. Sections
4.2 through 4.7 define the experimental environment including boundaries, workload and
metrics. Finally, Sections 4.8 and 4.9 explain the experimental implementation.
4.1 Problem Definition
4.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The goal of this research is to verify the theoretical analysis in Section 3.3.4 and
determine the actual attack power of DFA on the State on standard AES and research
driven rotational S-box AES designs. This analysis expects DFA on the State of standard
AES using one cipher pair reduction to produce an average keyspace of approximately
232.0677, while expecting all RAES Types to yield 240.0677. This research expands the overall
security analysis of a dynamic S-box AES to assess its practicality and usefulness compared
to standard AES and validates the existing theoretical DFA work on AES-128 [28].
4.1.2 Approach.
This research attacks both the standard AES-128 implementation with the existing
attack as described in Section 3.2.4 as a baseline and the four Rotational S-box AES-
128 implementations as defined in Section 3.2.2 with the extended attack as described in
Section 3.3.4. Specifically, focusing on 10K keyspace reductions and reductions of valid
10R allows verification of the theoretical analysis performed, and enables the analysis of
discrete reductions, not just expected averages. This discrete data sheds further light on the
underlying mechanics at work.
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4.2 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Cryptanalysis System. Because the focus is
several cryptanalysis techniques on different AES algorithms with the goal of key recovery,
the Component Under Test (CUT) is the Solver. The Solver solves the constructed DFE
by checking that the 10∆S0 relations hold. Other components of the system are the
cryptanalysis attack, the AES algorithm, the S-box, and the encryption environment. This
study limits the scope of these. The encryption algorithm is scoped to only AES-128
variants, specifically AES-128 and RAES-128 Types 1-4. Additionally, DFA attacks on the
State are the only cryptanalysis attacks considered. Lastly, the encryption environment is
restricted to software, rather than hardware, to more easily facilitate fault injection. Figure
4.1 depicts the system boundaries.
Figure 4.1: System Boundaries.
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4.3 System Services
The Cryptanalysis System provides a key recovery service. The possible outcomes
are: (1) full recovery of the encryption key, (2) reducing the keyspace to an unsecure size
such that an exhaustive search is feasible in one hour on a personal workstation using an
Intel i7 CPU with 8 GB of memory, (3) reducing the possible keyspace but exhaustive
search remains computationally infeasible in one hour on a personal workstation using an
Intel i7 CPU with 8 GB of memory, or (4) discovering no information and the keyspace
remains unaffected. This study focuses on outcome (1) as this is the only theoretical result
of the attacks considered.
4.4 Workload
The workload submitted to the system is a correct ciphertext and several corresponding
fault injected ciphertexts. These pairs are what the DFA specifically exploits. Workload
parameters also include the fault injection timing and location data and the AES
implementation as a successful DFA on the State attack requires this knowledge. This
study limits the fault injection timing and location to 8S20. The plaintext and key sent to
the encryption algorithm should not change attack complexity, thus they are not workload
parameters, but instead randomly generated.
4.5 Performance Metrics
Attack efficacy dictates system performance. The number of faulty ciphertexts
required for full key recovery most significantly captures efficacy. Reductions at each stage
of the solving process more precisely capture this performance and allows comparison
to the theoretical power calculated. Lastly, timing metrics roughly gauge work factors.
However, since computation time is not the main focus and not of critical importance,
minimal measures control the testing environment. Overall, these metrics provide a total
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picture of DFA attack power on standard AES-128 and the four Rotational S-box AES-128
implementations.
4.6 System Parameters
The system parameters are the attack implementation, computational resources, access
to the encryption machine, encryption environment, and any other available information
that might help the attack. Because this study limits its scope to DFA on the State attacks
and each depends on fault placement and AES implementation, these workload parameters
directly dictate the attack implementation. Computational resources are important because
they alter the time required to perform the attacks and put limits on the amount of
computation possible through memory limitations. If this system used a fully realized
attack, access to the encryption machine would be an important factor in choosing the
physical attack vector used to induce the faults. Because DFA attacks rely on inducing
faults through physical phenomena, the encryption hardware used affects the practicality
of an attack. The examined attacks require introduction of faults to specific positions of
the algorithm at specific times, and exploitable hardware is necessary. However, because
the encryption environment here is in software which also simulates faults (inducing them
intentionally through code as part of the encryption algorithm rather than through actual
physical processes on the encryption hardware) an exploitable encryption environment is
not a concern for this research. Any prior knowledge of the encryption system beyond the
encryption algorithm provides information that may reduce the possible keyspace.
4.7 Factors
The only factor of this study is attack implementation which has five levels relating
the standard AES and the four Rotational S-box AES Type implementations. This study




Evaluation occurs in multiple reduction steps. Simulations artificially inject faults
at arbitrary positions and times of the encryption algorithm without the overhead
of specialized hardware that true implementation and measurement would require.
Additionally, simulations produce actual data which provides a discrete and quantified set
of data to analyze, something missing in a purely analytic technique. This experimentation
produced a simulated environment, (R)AES-DFA v1.0, in Python 2.7.3. Appendix A covers
the steps taken to validate this software’s functionality.
Factors Levels
Encryption Algorithm AES, RAES Type 1, RAES Type 2, RAES Type 3,
RAES Type 4
Key Length 128 bit
Plaintext Encrypted Random bits
Encryption Key Random bits
Attack Type DFA on the State
Fault Induction Location Round 8, Byte 0 before MixColumns
Encryption Environment Software
Computational Resources 2011 2.8 Ghz i7 iMac with 8GB 1333 Mhz DDR3 Ram
Figure 4.2: Factors and Levels.
The simulation runs a given variant of AES for each plaintext and key pair given; first
running correctly and then injecting a random fault at the specified position and timing
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within the algorithm. The solver reduces the keyspace as much as possible from this
cipher pair as described in Section 3.3 using round 10 reductions. Reductions continues
with additional faulty ciphertexts until full key recovery. Validation that the attack was
successful occurs by checking the recovered key and plaintext values with the actual input
data.
The attack implementation treats each potential (10K, 10R) as part of the reduced
keyspace. This pairing counts two identical 10K recovered with different 10R as separate
valid 10K keys. Pilot studies of the attack implementation revealed that round 10 reductions
could only ever reduce the keyspace to 2 regardless of the number of cipher pairs used.
Investigation revealed one 10K with two 10R values always made this keyspace of two,
not two 10K each with one 10R. Several stages capture all keyspace reductions. First,
cipher pairs reduce the keyspace to two. Then key schedule reductions occur to reduce
the 10K keyspace to one and correctly reverse to the encryption key 0K. Notable data for
analysis captured at each stage includes the size of the remaining keyspace, the valid 10R
values, and computation time. Capturing additional verification and replication data make
this experimentation fully repeatable. This data includes the plaintext and key used, the
resulting ciphertext, and the XOR fault used each time for a new faulty ciphertext. The
captured information provides a robust data set from which future work can replicate this
work to validate, correct, or improve upon the algorithms, data collected, and following
analysis.
4.9 Experimental Design
With only one factor, this experiment is trivially a full-factorial experimental design of
the simulated attack described in Section 4.8 requiring the following number of iterations:
(# successful attacks developed + # existing comparable attacks)×(#repetitions). Setting
the number of repetitions to 2,500 results in (4 + 1)× 2, 500 = 12, 500 iterations. Although
encryption is deterministic, this experiment only uses one class of keys and plaintexts, that
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is, completely random. As such, each repetition uses a random key and plaintext, thus
changing the resultant ciphertext. The simulation does nothing to standardize the faults
injected across attack implementations for each repetition. The large number of repetitions
follow from the extreme magnitude of the population and the small time cost of additional
operations discovered in pilot studies. A minimum of (2128 plaintexts) × (2128 keys) ×
(256 fault 1 values) × (255 fault 2 values) ≈ 2272 attack vectors exist for any given attack
implementation. Thus, even a sample of 2500 is only roughly 2−254% of the possible attack
vectors. Analysis uses a 95% confidence level.
4.10 Methodology Summary
The goal of this study is to determine the security of a dynamic S-box AES design by
attacking AES-128 and RAES-128 implementations with simulated DFA. The SUT is the
Cryptanalysis System, which reduces the entropy of the encryption key. The CUT is the
Solver of DFE and recovers the encryption key. The factor tested is attack implementation.
Simulated attacks provide more meaningful data for analysis while remaining cheap and
easy to implement. This data allows verification of the theoretical analysis in Section 3.3.
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V. Analysis of Experimental Attack Results
This chapter analyzes the experimental data captured as described in Section 4.8. The
focus of this chapter is validation of the theoretical average keyspace reduction after 1
pair of ciphertexts leveraging round 10 reductions. This chapter also analyzes reductions
after multiple pairs along with a few other interesting discussions and observations about
the data. The data captured for each attack includes: the AES implementation; total
runtime required; number of faulty ciphertexts required; the plaintext encrypted; the
encryption key; the recovered encryption key; runtimes required for each faulty ciphertext
reduction; keyspace remaining after each faulty ciphertext reduction; the fault value that
when XOR’ed with 8S20 is the resulting faulty value used moving forward; the resulting
faulty ciphertext; the average columnspace after each faulty ciphertext reduction; and, if a
RAES implementation, the number and values of 10R still valid after each faulty ciphertext
reduction.
5.1 Existing Attack
Prior research establishes a round 10 reduced keyspace of 232, analysis in Section
3.3.3 establishes a slightly higher 4, 501, 500, 262 ≈ 232.0677 average. Figure 5.1 displays
the frequency of reduced keyspaces after one pair of faulty ciphertexts with the expected
and observed averages marked. This data greatly departs from a normal distribution with
a very long and non-continuous tail. The observed mean is 5, 404, 337, 163 ≈ 232.3314,
902, 756, 005 ≈ 229.7497 larger than the theoretical average. However, the log2 of the
observed and theoretical means only differ by 0.2637. Figure 5.2 represents this same
data in a boxplot. This highlights the skew of the data.
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Figure 5.2: Boxplot of AES-128 10K Keyspace, 1 Faulty Ciphertext Round 10 Reduction.
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Examining the quartile values in Figure 5.3, the first two quartiles occur in a range
of 693, 043, 200, while the third quartile spans a range of 3, 303, 014, 399 and the last
27, 981, 250, 661. This analysis explores this extreme skew in density later. Figure 5.4
displays the data as log2 transformed which helps to minimize this skew, although a bottom
heavy density remains apparent. Figure 5.5 displays this same log2 transformation applied
to the histogram. An additional line to mark the observed log2 mean is also added.
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
3, 317, 776, 000 3, 538, 944, 000 4, 010, 803, 200 7, 313, 817, 592 35, 295, 068, 253
231.6275 231.7206 231.9012 232.7679 235.0387



































Figure 5.4: Boxplot of Log2 Transformed AES-128 10K Keyspace, 1 Faulty Ciphertext
Round 10 Reduction.
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Log2 Transformed Reduced Keyspace from 1 Cipher Pair Round 10 Reduction on AES−128
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Figure 5.5: Histogram of Log2 Transformed AES-128 10K Keyspace, 1 Faulty Ciphertext
Round 10 Reduction.
This transformation creates a more interesting representation of the data. The data
manifests in several high density spikes approximately around 31.8, 32.9, 34.9 and 35.9.
Each grouping appears to be close to a normal distribution, and lessening in magnitude with
each additional power of 2. This observed data makes sense as the most likely theoretical
average is (127 × ( 127255 )3 × 24)4 = 3, 970, 610, 628 ≈ 231.8867, and each time another key
byte has 4 possibilities rather than 2, an increase by one power of 2 occurs. As these
4 possibility key bytes are unlikely with probability (1/127), the diminishing frequency
fits. This analysis explains the drastic skew in density and the inter-group distributions.
The close to normal distributions around these groupings also require examination. Part
of the reduction power is the number of b relations expected to hold per column. The
average is 127 × ( 127255 )
3 ≈ 15.6889. However, discrete values cannot be decimal creating
slightly higher and lower values. If each column has 15 valid relations, 231.8867 becomes
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(15 × 24)4 = 3, 317, 760, 000 ≈ 231.6275, and at 16 becomes (16 × 24)4 = 4, 294, 967, 296 =
232. Combinations of 15 and 16 valid relation columns fall between these values and closer
to the average (e.g., (15×24)2×(16×24)2 = 3, 774, 873, 600 ≈ 231.8137). The number of valid
b relations does not have nearly the same magnitude of effect on the expected remaining
keyspace as the number of valid byte keys. This smaller effect explains the intra-group
distributions.
Figure 5.6 shows the remaining keyspace after two faulty ciphertexts. Two attacks
still had 4 possible 10K values and a third had 16 possible 10K values. The attacks with
four keys remaining manifest either in one byte with four possible values and the 15 other
bytes fixed or two bytes with two possible values and the 14 other bytes fixed. Similarly,
the attack with sixteen possible keys remaining manifests in one of several possibilities:
two bytes with 4 possible values and the other 14 fixed; one byte with 4 values, two with 2
and the other 13 fixed; or four bytes with 2 values and the other 12 fixed. However, since
no attacks yielded 2 possible 10K values after two faulty ciphertexts, only bytes with four
possible values likely create the overlap of these three keyspaces. The observed remaining
mean keyspace is 2497+2+2+162500 = 1+ .0084, significantly larger than the expected 1+2
−63.8646.
The analysis of multiple faulty ciphertexts in Section 3.3.4 assumed the non-valid keyspace
bytes were random because claiming an underlying relationship requires substantial data,
analysis and understanding. This attack implementation did not collect the actual potential
keyspace values at intermediate reduction stages. Further analysis requires at least this
data, so explaining the unexpected non-valid keyspace bytes after two faulty ciphertexts
is not possible. However, these three attacks with multiple possible 10K values remaining
suggest the non-valid keyspace bytes are not random.
The quartiles show that the median value is well below the theoretical average,
however the extreme upper half values skew the mean above the median. Overall, the
theoretical averages appear to underestimate the true average reduction by not properly
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accounting for either the likelihood of the one 4 key byte associated b value being valid, or
the associated drastic increase in remaining keyspace. Although still an underestimation,
the theoretical average appears to more closely estimate the average log2 remaining
keyspace. Additionally, the reduction power between two cipher pairs does not provide
enough information to adequately predict the number of cipher pairs required on average.
Reduced keyspaces associated with faulty ciphertexts appear non-random and to have some
increased association.






















Figure 5.6: Histogram of AES-128 10K Keyspace, 2 Faulty Ciphertext Round 10 Reduction.
As mentioned in Section 4.5, because this experimentation used no explicitly
controlled testing environment, rigorous analysis of timing data is not valid. However,
to provide a context to the work factor required for the attack, a histogram of attack times
follows in Figure 5.7. The average attack time is 0.1747 seconds.
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Figure 5.7: Histogram of AES-128 DFA Runtime.
5.2 Attack Extension
Section 3.3.4 established an average theoretical remaining keyspace of 240.0677 after
1 cipher pair round 10 reduction on RAES implementations. This section analyzes the
observed experimental data in an effort to validate this expected theoretical analysis. First,
Figure 5.8 shows the log2 transformed boxplot of this reduction across each of the four
RAES-128 Type implementations. Theoretical analysis resulted in the same reduction
regardless of Type, these observed data agree. Formally checking this conclusion with the
Tukey multiple comparisons of means test in Figure 5.9 confirms that there is no statistical
difference in the average reduction power regardless of RAES implementation. The 0
RAES Implementation Type is the combination of all Types 1-4. Thus, analysis moving














































































































































Log2 Transformed Reduced Keyspace from 1 Ciper Pair, Round 10 Reduction
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Observed Mean
Figure 5.8: Boxplots of Log2 Transformed RAES-128 10K Keyspace, 1 Faulty Ciphertext
Round 10 Reduction.





















95% family−wise confidence level
Differences in mean levels of factor(rType)
Figure 5.9: Tukey Multiple Comparisons of Means Test of RAES-128 Types, 1 Faulty
Ciphertext Round 10 Reduction.
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Figure 5.10 is a histogram of the 1 cipher pair, round 10 reduction on all Rotational
S-box AES implementations. This reduction, although much closer to normal than the
existing attack’s data still maintains the extreme skew in density with a long right tail
and high outliers. The expected theoretical mean is 1, 152, 384, 067, 070 ≈ 240.0677. The
observed mean is 1, 236, 479, 882, 848 ≈ 240.1693, 84, 095, 815, 778 larger than expected.
However, the difference of the log2 of the means is only 0.1016.
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Figure 5.10: Histogram of RAES-128 10K Keyspace, 1 Faulty Ciphertext Round 10
Reduction.
Examining the quartiles in Figure 5.11, like in the existing attack on AES, the median
is below the expected average. However, now the third quartile contributes significantly
less to the skew. Instead, the immense magnitude of the values in the last quartile produce
this skew. Due to the extreme scaling of keyspaces, like before in the existing attack
analysis, using a log2 transformation helps make this more meaningful data. Figure 5.12
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displays the transformed histogram. The result is a normal distribution centered near the
theoretical average. Unfortunately that does not encompass all the data; another near
normal distribution centered near 41.5 and several extreme right outliers also are present.
Figure 5.11: Quartiles of RAES-128 10K Keyspace, 1 Faulty Ciphertext Round 10
Reduction.
Log2 Transformed Reduced Keyspace from 1 Cipher Pair Round 10 Reduction
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Figure 5.12: Histogram of Log2 Transformed RAES-128 10K Keyspace, 1 Faulty
Ciphertext Round 10 Reduction.
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The normal distribution hot spot near 240 fits with the theoretical analysis. The
secondary distribution around 241.5 and the lack of tertiary and quaternary reduction pockets
as seen in the existing analysis need further investigation. The existing attack had those hot
spots from the unlikely ‘high’ number of key byte stepbacks (i.e., the 4 key byte b values).
Now for an attack to deviate from the rest, each of the 256 S-boxes used need to hit the
‘high’ key byte stepbacks. This property has an averaging effect making the values seen
more consistent: (total reduced keyspace) = ((S-box0 reduced keyspace) + (S-box1 reduced
keyspace) + . . . + (S-box255 reduced keyspace)) = (Average S-boxi reduced keyspace) ×28.
As discussed in the analysis of the existing attack, the number of valid b relations has
a much smaller effect on keyspace size than the number of valid byte keys per valid b.
Examining the maximum value of 243.0384, if every S-box had the same stepback properties
as S-box0, only each of the 256 S-box stepbacks resulting in about a 235 reduced keyspace
would achieve such a large remaining keyspace (235 × 28 = 243). Since Figure 5.5 holds
only four attacks with keyspaces near 235, seeing this 256 times for a single discrete attack
would be extremely unlikely. With reasonable certainty, the other S-box’s do not have
such uniform stepback properties. This variability may be due to S-box construction using
multiplicative inverses, but rotating the S-box removes this property. Thus a histogram
like Figure 5.5 for an alternate S-box would likely have a much greater variance with high
density hot spots spaced more sporadically and more extreme outlier values.
As mentioned in Section 4.8, the keyspace calculation depends on 10R values, thus
one 10K and two 10R create an observed keyspace of two. Pilot studies revealed this
duplicity is exactly what happens. These studies revealed that, regardless the number of
faulty ciphertexts used, Round 10 column reductions maximumly reduce the keyspace to
two 10R and one 10K. The experimental data shows these two possible rotation 10 values
are always 128 apart. A rotation of 128 is a special case because a half rotation is its own
inverse, b  128  128 = b  256 = b. This addition of 128 mod 256 flips the leftmost
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bit which is exactly an XOR of 128. Thus, SBR(128) =  128 = ⊕ 128. This one case
of R = 128 is a special case of the general extension tried in Section 3.3.2. Analyzing this
property in the additive SBR fault propagation model outlined in Figure 3.12 from 10∆S0
to 10∆S1, if 10R = θ is valid, then 10R = θ  128 is also valid.
SBR(10S00, θ) ⊕ SBR(10S¯00, θ) = 10S10 ⊕ 10S¯10 = 10∆S10
SBR(10S00, θ 128) ⊕ SBR(10S¯00, θ 128) = SBR(SBR(10S00, θ), 128) ⊕ SBR(SBR(10S¯00, θ), 128)
= (SBR(10S00, θ) ⊕ 128) ⊕ (SBR(10S¯00, θ) ⊕ 128)
= (SBR(10S00, θ) ⊕ SBR(10S¯00, θ)) ⊕ (128 ⊕ 128)
= 10∆S10 ⊕ 0 = 10∆S10
The theoretical expected average keyspace of Section 3.3.4 overlooks this ( 128)
equivalence. Including this additional information, the theoretical mean after one faulty
ciphertext drops to 239.0677. Accounting for this equivalence in the observed data, the
observed mean is 239.1693. This adjustment does not consider 10R not 128 apart with
the same 10K which possibly creates an overcount of remaining 10K. However, any such
overcount is likely negligible. The increased observed mean remaining keyspace over the
theoretical existing AES attack is likely due to an inherent skew in the data not fully or
properly captured in the theoretical analysis. Although the theoretical mean reductions
are underestimations, they are still great estimates of the magnitude of the remaining
keyspace as evidence in the close log2 transformed means. In most areas of work, an error
of 239.1693 − 239.0677 = 42, 071, 374, 371 is not considered negligible, or even acceptable.
However, the difference of the log2 of the means is only 0.1016. For purposes of knowing
the general work factor and computing power necessary to perform an attack, the theoretical
analysis is more than sufficient.
Figure 5.13 shows the number of valid 10R values after two ciphertext reductions.
Every single attack reduced to two 10R values at this point meaning just the correct 10R and
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10R ⊕ 128 remain. Since these share the same reduced keyspaces, the observed remaining
keyspace overcounts the actual remaining keyspace by a factor of 2. Figure 5.14 displays
the log2 transformed histogram of the true remaining keyspace accounting for this double
count.
Reduced Rotationspace from 2 Faulty Ciphertexts Round 10 Reduction



















Figure 5.13: Histogram of Remaining R10, 2 Faulty Ciphertext Round 10 Reduction.
The vast majority of the time, specifically 9, 263 of 10, 000 attacks, a reduction to one
valid 10K occurs after two faulty ciphertexts. However, compared to the attack on AES, a
larger possible remaining keyspace of 64 is possible after this double reduction, with 2 and
4 much more common. The updated theoretical expected remaining keyspace accounting
for the double count is 1+2−49.8646. The observed mean remaining 10K keyspace is 1+.1893.
As with the existing attack, proper explanation of this disparity is not possible without
further data and analysis. Figure 5.15 shows that reducing with a third faulty ciphertext
leaves just 8 total attacks that still require reduction at 2 and 4 10K values. Application of
the key schedule reversal reductions would likely reduce these to just 1 10K value, however
this attack implementation did not attempt that reduction.
68
Log2 Reduced Keyspace from 2 Faulty Ciphertexts Round 10 Reduction
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Figure 5.14: Histogram of Log2 Transformed Observed/2 RAES-128 10K Keyspace, 2
Faulty Ciphertext Round 10 Reduction.
Reduced Keyspace from 3 Faulty Ciphertexts Round 10 Reduction


















Figure 5.15: Histogram of Observed/2 RAES-128 10K Keyspace, 3 Faulty Ciphertext
Round 10 Reduction.
69
Figure 5.16 shows that total keyspace reduction requires a maximum of four cipher
pairs, thus no further keyspace histograms are necessary for analysis. The increased
remaining keyspace of 239.1693 after 1 faulty ciphertext does not explain the increased
number of remaining valid 10K after multiple faulty ciphertexts compared to the theoretical
expected value or the existing attack on AES. Since only the two 10R 128 apart remain
after two or more faulty ciphertexts and these share the same keyspace, effectively only
the keyspace associated with one S-box remains. Were the reductions between all S-boxes
uniform, Figure 5.14 would be indistinguishable from a log2 transformation of Figure 5.6.
Therefore, the less evenly distributed key byte densities of rotated S-boxes, which do not
change the average reduction, impact discrete cases by increasing overlapping matches
between reductions. Figure 5.17 displays the runtime required for full key recovery.
Meaningful in depth analysis of runtimes is not valid. However, this increased average
runtime of 11.38 seconds - over 60 times the runtime required for the existing attack on
AES - provides context for the work factor of the attack.
Number of Cipher Pairs Required for Key Recovery in DFA on RAES−128


















Figure 5.16: Histogram of Required Cipher Pairs for Full Key Recovery on RAES-128.
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Figure 5.17: Histogram of RAES-128 DFA Runtime.
5.3 Design Suggestions
Recovery of the round 10 encryption key is the crux of existing DFA attacks. RAES
implementations create more complexity in reversing 10K to the encryption key. Since the
key schedule does not need to be invertible (both encryption and decryption logically step
forward through the key schedule, only optimization possibly uses invertibility), adding
further complexity to this algorithm such that reversal is infeasible would weaken these
attacks. Changing the key schedule entirely, creating a one way function would also
accomplish this goal, but modifying the existing key schedule requires less alterations and
would take less work to vet since over a decade of research and use well establish the
foundations of the existing key schedule. A modified key schedule which creates three
expanded keys follows.
• Key Schedule 3. The RAES key schedule 2 creates two expanded keys. As intended,
the first is the expanded rotation key. However, the second is the expanded key
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schedule rotation key. XORing all 16 bytes of each round creates expanded key
schedule rotation values. These values define the S-boxi used in the SW operation
of the third key expansion. This third expanded key built is the expanded encryption
key.
Previously, the expansion of the expanded encryption key only relied on one S-boxi
creating 256 possible ways to rebuild the encryption key from 10K. This new scheme uses
a rotation value for each round of the encryption key schedule effectively creating a (28)10
work factor to reverse 10K to the encryption key. Now, even with a successful DFA on the
State, reversal through the key schedule is computationally infeasible. Instead, Eve needs
to perform this DFA attack on each round (10K enables decryption to the end of round 9,
9K enables decryption to the end of round 8, etc.) until the work factor is computationally
feasible. This attack method increases the resources and access required of an attacker by
increasing the number of faulty ciphertext pairs required. DFA on the Key Schedule could
possibly bypass some of this work factor or leverage a more powerful fault injection, but
since each round rotates by a separate value, full reversal would still likely be infeasible
or highly costly with few faults. Following is an updated list of implementations which
includes this new key schedule.
• RAES Type 1. Key Schedule 1 and Rotation Reduction 1
• RAES Type 2. Key Schedule 1 and Rotation Reduction 2
• RAES Type 3. Key Schedule 2 and Rotation Reduction 1
• RAES Type 4. Key Schedule 2 and Rotation Reduction 2
• RAES Type 5. Key Schedule 3 and Rotation Reduction 1
• RAES Type 6. Key Schedule 3 and Rotation Reduction 2
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5.4 Analysis Summary
The mean observed remaining keyspace after applying the existing attack to AES-128
is higher than expected. The theoretical analysis explains the range and relative densities
of values seen, but does not fully account for the high outliers. However, this analysis still
provides a good estimate of the general expected complexity and reduction power. Analysis
of the observed extension data reveals that the S-box rotation only introduces a complexity
of 128, not 256 for DFA attacks because  128 = ⊕ 128. Updating the theoretical analysis
to include this information reduces the expected mean to 239.0677. This theoretical mean also
underestimates the observed remaining keyspace, but again the theoretical analysis explains
the range and relative densities of the values seen, while not fully accounting for the high
outliers. This analysis still provides a good estimate of the general expected complexity
and reduction power. The increase in attack time from AES-128 to RAES-128 highlights
the increased complexity RAES introduces. Altering the RAES key schedule creates an
effectively one way expanded encryption key expansion which mitigates DFA on the State.
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VI. Conclusion
Overall this research shows initial progress into the extension of applying existing
DFA techniques to Dynamic S-box AES implementations. This research uses RAES-128
for non-trivial simplicity, proof of concept, and flexibility in initial exploratory attempts.
Analysis produced a reasonable attack requiring one fault on the State in round 8, with
full key recovery possible with two or more faulty ciphertexts. The theoretical analysis of
the existing attack on AES slightly overestimates the observed average reduction power.
Analysis of the extension’s experimentation data revealed additional information allowing
the theoretical analysis to reduce to 239.0677. This value also slightly overestimates the
observed average reduction power.
6.1 Impact
This research reveals RAES-128 Types 1-4 are nominally more secure than AES-
128 against DFA attacks on the State. Therefore, these RAES implementations should
still incorporate current DFA mitigation techniques when securing high value data. The
proposed implementations, RAES-128 Types 5-6, should make key reversal more difficult
and costly, protecting the encryption key. However, DFA still enables full decryption with
sufficient resources. Therefore, RAES-128 Types 5-6 should still incorporate current DFA
mitigation techniques when securing high value data. Despite the potential of RAES-
128 Types 5-6, this paper still recommends use of non-proprietary best practice AES
implementations following the guidelines established in [2] because these platforms are
transparent, well established and regularly publicly reviewed and updated.
6.2 Contributions
This research made several contributions to cryptology.
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• This research determines extension of current DFA attacks to Dynamic S-box
AES variants is possible. Chapter 3 extends DFA on the State to RAES-128
implementations.
• This research reveals expected keyspace reduction power of DFA extensions.
Section 3.3.4 expects DFA on the State of all four RAES-128 implementations to
have a reduction power of 2−88.9323.
• This research builds functional attacks which demonstrate full key and plaintext
recovery. Chapter 5 discusses how the (R)AES-DFA attack simulation platform
successfully attacks AES-128 and all RAES-128 implementations.
• This research provides an easy to follow and self-contained resource which
walks through the mechanics and analysis of DFA attacks. Chapters 2, 3 & 5
create a thorough introduction to DFA on the State.
• This research appreciably adds to the overall security analysis of Dynamic S-box
AES variants. Chapters 3 & 5 provide insight on DFA concerns.
• This research contributes to the literature of theoretical analysis. Chapter 3
updates the existing analysis of DFA on the State of AES-128, and yields new
analysis of DFA on the State of RAES-128. Chapter 5 compares theoretical analysis
to experimental data.
• This research helps inform and shape future discussions of cryptographic
standards and algorithmic design decisions. An irreversible key schedule would
significantly mitigate DFA attack power.
6.3 Future Work
This research extends to a simple non-trivial Dynamic S-box AES variant. As such,
many vectors of improvement, expanded scope, and future work exist. Most directly,
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this manifests in leveraging the round 9 relations with a reasonable work factor and
extending DFA on the State to RAES-192 and RAES-256 implementations. Also, the
current theoretical analysis models need further attention to fully and more accurately
capture the expected reduction power of attacks. Other work includes implementing,
testing, and attacking the proposed RAES implementations, Types 5 and 6, or one similar
which theoretically makes key reversal computationally infeasible from the last round
key. Extending other DFA attacks, specifically DFA on the Key Schedule to RAES
implementations is another area of interesting future work. The last area of future work
is extending all DFA attacks to other Dynamic S-box variants.
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Appendix A: Discussion of Rotational S-box Design Decisions
AES-KDS as described in [22] leaves several implementation details open to
interpretation. This appendix first presents higher level questions, then discusses case and
type specific ambiguities.
The most significant unknown is directly related to the S-box rotation. The round
rotation value “...is used to rotate the S-box. The resulting S-box is used during the
SubBytes operation.” And “each round AES-KDS S-box can have 256 possible entries.
Totally there are 10 rounds. So total number of possible S-boxes is given by,
256 × 256 × 256 × 256 × 256 × 256 × 256 × 256 × 256 × 256 = 280”.
These passages make clear each round rotates the S-box, but do not define if this is the
standard AES S-box or the previous round’s S-box. That is, it is not well defined if the
application of RotSBox is iterative. The only clue is provided by the pseudo code. Below





create s box(s box,rotate);




add round key(round*4,state,expanded key);
}
77
For this code to work as expected and described in [22], these function calls must be by
reference. Otherwise, create s box(s box,rotate) would create a newly rotated S-
box that is never used in substitute bytes(state,s box) and further the state would
never be updated. Thus, given only this information, an iterative S-box rotation is the most
logical conclusion.
The other high-level problem is that the provided pseudo code does not provide
sufficient detail to make data structures, variables, and operations well defined. Several
instances of this lack of definition are now provided.
The first case of non-explicit definition is the pseudo code function
create s box(s box,rotate), which is described only by the comment “\\ function to
rotate S-box to left by a value equal to rotate”. This follows the logical explanation of the
RotSBox step, however no explicit definition or pseudo code is provided. This allows for
the ambiguity of an iterative S-box to remain. As such, only a logical application of the
description within the paper and pseudo code can be applied.
A similar problem exists with key expansion(expanded key,key,s box). This
pseudo code function is only described by the comment ‘\\ as in original AES’. The pseudo
code snippet below shows the context of key expansion as used in the key schedule sec-
tion of the algorithm:
rotate=temp;
create s box(s box,rotate);
key expansion(expanded key1,key,s box);
// as in original AES
for(i=0;i<44;i++)
fprintf(ky1,"%lx ",expanded key1[i]);
On a high level, this code appears to set a rotate value and rotate the S-box by this value.
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Then, the encryption key is expanded using the standard AES key expansion algorithm
with the exception that S-box lookups use this rotated S-box. The resulting expanded
key is saved as expanded key1. No explicit definition or pseudo code is provided for
key expansion, so logical interpretation is necessary.
Variable specific problems are also present in the pseudo code. For both Type 1 and 2
key schedules, the variable key receives a hard coded value. Below are pertinent snippets




create s box(s box,rotate);




create s box(s box,rotate);
key expansion(expanded key1,key,s box);
...
create s box(s box,shift);
key expansion(expanded key2,key,s box);
Logical interpretation of this would mean key expansion and thus encryption was not
dependent on the provided encryption key. If this were the case, encryption of a given
plaintext with two different keys would result in the same resulting ciphertext. However,
this is not the case as seen in the paper’s experimental results. Therefor, this must be
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interpreted as an example key value provided to clarify its structure and use in the pseudo
code.
The next potential problem relates to Case 2 round rotation keys. The paper text
describes the reduction from round rotation key to round rotation value as the ‘XOR
operation of all the bytes’:
Suppose for a particular round j, if the round key value is
06ACB47D588A9ED837D50E923C4055B5 (each byte represented by 2-Hex
digits).
Here XOR operation of all the bytes is taken.
15(Hex)=06ˆACˆB4ˆ7Dˆ58ˆ8Aˆ9EˆD8ˆ37ˆD5ˆ0Eˆ92ˆ3Cˆ40ˆ55ˆB5 (ˆsymbol used
for XOR)
The resulting byte value 15(Hex) is used to rotate the Sbox.
However, the pseudo code to accompany this does not logically perform the XOR as
described. Provided is a pertinent snippet:










The rotate value calculated in this pseudo code is only the XOR of 4 bytes, not all
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16 bytes of the round rotation key. Each expanded key[i] index must be a 4 byte
value. This follows from many details. Traditionally, the expanded key of AES-128 is
represented by a 4x44 matrix of bytes. This is a result of the way the key is expanded
and computed columnwise. The indented rotate value represents rotate computed for
rounds 1 through 9, while the second Rotate value represents rotate computed for round
10. Indices 40-43 are accessing the last four ‘columns’ of the expanded key with indexing
starting at 0. Additionally, for four values to represent 16 bytes in total, each must represent
4 bytes. Tracing out the operation, first, four 4-byte values are XOR’ed resulting in one
4-byte value. This one 4-byte value is then bitwise AND’ed (&) with mask=0xff, the one
byte value 1111 1111b. Thus, depending on endianness, only the most or least significant
byte is saved into rotate. The same logical reduction of round rotation key to round
rotation value using the XOR of all bytes is again used in Case 4, “XOR operation of all
bytes is taken”, however no pseudo code is provided [22].
The last part of the algorithm which is not clearly defined is the Type 2 key schedule.
Two rotation values are calculated, one from the encryption key as in Type 1, and the
second from expanded key1. How this second rotation value is logically formed is not
described in the text which only notes, “These round keys are also used for finding a value
for rotating the S-box, which will be used in generating [the] second set of round keys”.
Below is a pseudo code snippet which describes the second rotation value’s calculation:
for(i=0;i<43;i++)
{












create s box(s box,shift);
key expansion(expanded key2,key,s box);
Notably, temp is initialized as an unsigned char and therefor can hold up to a
byte of information; mask, shift, and shift1 are not initialized earlier in this code
section. The first for loop XOR’s each ‘column’ of the expanded key together. The
first time through the loop expanded key1[1] is XOR’ed with expanded key1[0].
The second pass XOR’s expanded key1[2] with expanded key1[1]. At this point
expanded key1[1] is expanded key1[1]ˆexpanded key1[0]. Thus, by the last pass
of the loop, expanded key1[43] = expanded key1[43]ˆexpanded key1[42]ˆ · · ·
ˆexpanded key1[1]ˆexpanded key1[0]. The next nested for loop section is where
lack of explicit details becomes problematic. Ignoring the nested loops and only examining
the contents, these five lines of code appear to XOR several bytes together.
In the first line, temp=expanded key1[44]&mask, mask is used, which is not
initialized in this code section; however, mask is initialized in an earlier pseudo code
section detailing Case 2 encryption. If the same initialization is assumed, let mask=0xff.
Additionally, expanded key1[44] is referenced, however the previous loop only iterates
through expanded key1[43]. As discussed previously, expanded key1 must be an array
of length 44 (and so indices 0-43) to represent the 44 ‘columns’ of the expanded key. To
further this interpretation, Case 2 encryption pseudo code only accesses indices 0-43 of
expanded key. Thus, let the 44 reference be assumed to be a typo which should read
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43. This then makes the first line set temp to the ’first’ byte (most or least significant byte
depending on endianness) of expanded key[43].
Moving to the next line, temp=temp>>shift1, shift1 is unknown. However, as
shift1 is incremented by 8 each iteration, or one byte (as seen in the third line), and temp
holds the value of just one byte, it is logical to assume shift1=0 as the initialization. Thus,
on the first pass, this line has no effect. The third line, shift1=shift1+8, as previously
mentioned increments shift1 by 8, or one byte. The fourth line bit shifts mask to the
left by one byte. This logically agrees with the prior assumption of its initialization. The
last line is the most interesting, shift=shiftˆtemp. shift is not initialized, however,
an initialization to 0 is logical. This would set shift=temp which is the ’first’ byte of
expanded key1[43] on the first pass.
Tracing through subsequent passes, temp is set to the next byte of expanded key1[43]
and bit shifted by one byte so there is not a byte worth of trailing zeros. shift1 and mask
are appropriately updated, and shift is XOR’ed with this second byte. Thus shift is
now the XOR of the first two bytes of expanded key1[43]. After the first four iterations,
shift is the XOR of all four bytes of expanded key1[43], or logically when considering
the prior loop, the XOR of every byte in expanded key1. The utility of the outer for loop
is not apparent. If it is not a misprint, then the resulting value of shift would end up
being 0 (xˆxˆxˆx=0 for any given value x). As the iterators i and j are not referenced in
the content of the loops, each iteration of the outer loop would be exactly the same. Based
on the other calculations performed to reduce the round keys to round rotation values in
Cases 2 and 4, and the reductions of the encryption key for the first rotation values com-
puted in the key schedules, all of which are the XOR of all bytes being handled, it is logical
to assume the nested loops is a typo and this block is intended to XOR all the bytes of
expanded key1.
83
For this research, an implementation of this algorithm was written in Python 2.7
building off of the Scripting Languages Open-source Workable AES (SLOWAES) code
base [8]. First the code’s base functions were tested for proper functionality by using
NIST sample values and walkthroughs [1], and were successfully validated. Next, the
algorithm as best described by [22] and discussed above was implemented on top of
this validated AES implementation. Each step was validated and carefully examined and
stepped through to ensure encryption was following all expected logical flow. The rotate
step specifically was vetted with the example rotated S-box as provided by [22]. Validation
of this implementation of AES-KDS was reliant on the sample encryption data provided in
the paper which is shown below:
Figure A.1: AES-KDS Validation Encryptions [22].
It is important to note that only sample encryptions for Case 4, Type 2 as described
in [22] are provided, and no intermediate steps or key schedule data is available. Thus,
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validation of this algorithm is wholly dependent on just 8 encryptions and only one
Case can truly be validated. To accomplish this, encryption of the four plaintexts with
the two keys was performed, however the resulting ciphertexts did not match those
provided. Because of the ambiguities described in the prior section, the possibility of a
misinterpretation was reasonable. Thus, iterative encryptions testing these possibilities was
performed. What follows is a description of each moving part tried, and an analysis of how
many combinations were tested.
– Iterative S-box encryption: Is the S-box iteratively rotated between rounds of
encryption? [Yes/No] 2 possibilities.
– Iterative S-box key schedule: Is the S-box iteratively rotated between creation of
expanded key1 and expanded key2? This is handled by a later iterator, 1 possibilities.
– Iterative S-box key schedule to encryption: Is the S-box iteratively rotated between the
key schedule and the encryption rounds? [Yes/No] 2 possibilities.
– How is the round rotation key reduced to the round rotation value? [XOR of all bytes
as logically described/XOR of most significant bytes as in pseudo code/XOR of least
significant bytes as in pseudo code] 3 possibilities.
– In the key schedule, how is the first rotate value calculated? [XOR of all bytes of
encryption key/XOR of all bytes of hardcoded pseudo code key] Because of the importance
of using the correct keys and the lack of explicit definition, all 256 rotation values [0-255]
are used. 256 possibilities.
– In the key schedule, how is the second rotate value shift calculated? [XOR of all bytes
of expanded key1] Because of the lack of explicit definition of how the rotation value is
calculated, and if rotation is iterative with the first performed, all 256 rotation values [0-
255] are used. 256 possibilities.
– Expanded key altered by XOR of columns [Yes/No] 2 possibilities.
– Next the number of encryption keys checked is discussed. To cover potential
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implementation specific issues, alternate endianess representations of the two keys for
architectures ranging from 16-bit to 128-bit (excessively large range for completeness)
are used. Note this is only applied to the keys and not plaintext because the all 0 plaintext
will still result in a match. 8 possibilities. When the encryption key is stored as a 4x4
matrix, by design it is to be stored by filling the rows. When the plaintext is stored as a 4x4
matrix, by design it is to be stored by filling the columns. To cover any potential mixup of
these details, the transpose of the key is also checked. 2x possibilities. Totally that makes
(2 + 8) × 2 = 20 encryption keys. 20 possibilities.
– Finally the number of plaintext checked is discussed. As mentioned above, the key and
plaintext are stored in a different indexing. To overcome a potential mixup, the transpose
of each plaintext is also encrypted. 2x possibilities. Totally this makes 4 × 2 = 8 plaintext.
8 possibilities.
When all these moving parts are checked in totality, it amounts to 2×1×2×3×256×
256× 2× 20× 8 = 251, 658, 240 or approximately a quarter of a billion encryptions. All of
these were checked, and no match was found. The authors of the paper were also reached
out to for more validation data, intermediate calculations, or more detail and definition,
but no response was received. Thus, given the thorough validation efforts, and the amount
of ambiguity found in [22], an implementation was chosen which was most logical and
followed most directly from the data provided in the paper. This implementation, RAES,
is logically described in Section 3.2.2, with walk through encryption and key schedule
examples to best facilitate repeatability and future validation and verification provided in
Appendix B.
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Appendix B: RAES Validation Data
Figure B.1: AES-128 Encryption and Expanded Key of [1] Example Data.
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Figure B.2: RAES-128 Type 1 Encryption and Expanded Key of [1] Example Data.
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Figure B.3: RAES-128 Type 2 Encryption and Expanded Key of [1] Example Data.
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Figure B.4: RAES-128 Type 3 Encryption and Expanded Keys of [1] Example Data.
90
Figure B.5: RAES-128 Type 4 Encryption and Expanded Keys of [1] Example Data.
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